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COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE AND TYING
ARRANGEMENTS: A FRESH
APPRECIATION FOR PER SE
ILLEGALITY*
The computer industry embodies what has been called "innovational competition."' The two components of innovational competition
are price performance ("bang for the buck") and functional capability
(the services a given product provides). Innovational competition requires that firms develop new products which, when brought to market,
will attract customers due to improved features of price performance
and/or functional capabilities. 2 Rather than merely matching the advantages of the new product (involving a lag-time during which customer loyalty may erode), competing computer firms prefer to respond
by developing even better products.3 Consumer desires for more powerful and efficient software has increased the demand for more powerful
and efficient hardware, and firms have emerged that specialize in products of one or both sorts. The driving force behind this innovational
competition has been the intellectual labor of software designers. 4 The
production of such intellectual labor is stimulated primarily by the
profit motive. The ability to profit from one's intellectual labor is, in
turn, protected by copyright.
Copyright and antitrust law use opposing means to, within different
facets of economic activity, achieve the larger goal of increasing society's welfare. Kept within their own spheres of influence there is no
inconsistency between copyright and antitrust. It is when the advantages and tools appropriate to one sphere of activity are used to upset
the workings of another sphere of activity that these two areas of law
conflict.
It would be an over-simplification to say that copyright merely protects against copying a work. While copyright does not grant an exclusionary right to an underlying idea or discovery, it does protect an
* Copyright 1990, Daniel K. Dik, all rights reserved.
1. A. CLAPES, SoFrwARE, COPYRIGHT, & COMPETITION: THE "LOOK AND FEEL" OF

THE LAw 25 (1989).
2. Id. at 25-26.
3. Id. at 26.
4. Id.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

author's expression of that idea. Copyright is used by society to encourage the production of artistic and scholarly works by protecting the
monetary rewards for the fruits of intellectual labor.
Antitrust doctrines shape the broad contours of the commercial
playing field by seeking to increase competition. Building upon the
premise that the spur of competition leads to better products at better
prices and improves overall allocative efficiency (as a consequence of
choices in the market made by informed buyers), antitrust law seeks to
eliminate anti-competitive commercial behavior and concentrations of
economic power which could harm free markets.
The potential conflicts between copyright and antitrust may be witnessed through the practice of tying arrangements in the computer industry. A tying arrangement conditions the sale of one item upon the
purchase of another item. Such arrangements have been considered antitrust violations under both the Sherman and the Clayton Acts. More
recently, allegations of tying have arisen in the computer industry,
often involving copyrighted materials. Currently, a disagreement exists
between the Sixth and the Ninth Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding computer tying arrangements involving copyrighted disc operating software. The positions of these courts are directly related to the
two circuits' different views on copyright. The Ninth Circuit has held
that copyright protection of disc operating systems is intrinsically and
legally sufficient to rationally presume that sufficient tying product
power exists to enact an illegal tying arrangement. 5 The Sixth Circuit
6
has rejected this view.
This Note argues that copyright protection of disc operating
software does rationally lead to a presumption of economic advantage
sufficient to make a tying arrangement feasible. Such tying arrangements deserve their current status of per se illegality because they are
undesirable and unnecessary restraints of trade. In addition, such arrangements involving copyrighted software increase to an unwarranted
degree the economic price society must bear in bringing such creative
works to general use.
In Section I of this Note, copyright and its history are examined
and the conclusion is drawn that copyright grants the holder a bundle
of government protected rights to exclusive economic exploitation of a
created item, and that as such, copyright is a grant of potential economic power. In Section II, economic arguments which deny the existence and harm of tying arrangements are addressed. Section III traces
the development of the unique item tying arrangement doctrine in the
5. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied,
473 U.S. 908 (1985).
6. A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics Inc., 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
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United States Supreme Court, concluding that per se illegality has always admitted the possibility of defenses and that to prohibit unjustifiable tying arrangements can best harmonize the different public
policies and methods of control behind copyright and antitrust. Section
IV draws upon the previous sections and develops the issues discussed
in the split between the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits regarding the
proper treatment of tying arrangements involving copyrighted software
products. The section concludes that the position of the Ninth Circuit is
shown to be truer to both Supreme Court precedent and to the essence
of copyright itself. Section V of this Note contends that the Ninth Circuit's rules of per se illegality with limited available defenses are rational, particularly appropriate to the computer industry, and should be
adopted as the general rules in this area. These rules will preserve the
spur of competition which drives continued innovation while allowing
society through copyright to spur and reward such innovation without
overpaying.
I.

COPYRIGHT AS ECONOMIC POWER
A.

THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT

A brief examination of the history of copyright will help reveal the
commercial nature of these exclusive rights. Copyright can be traced
back to the establishment by royal decree in 1556 of the Stationers
Company by which the English Crown sought to check the spread of
the Protestant Reformation in England. The decree concentrated publishing in one house and required published works to be entered into
the Company's Register. By virtue of this Register and with the aid of
the Star Chamber, the Stationer was able to obtain a series of royal
licenses entitling the Stationer to the sole right to publish works. Initially then, this government protection extended control of works to the
7
publisher; the author's interests were not so protected.
The last Stationer's license expired in 1694. Pirate publishing
houses sprang up and began to encroach upon the Stationer's publishing
monopoly. The Stationer therefore sought from Parliament a law
which would protect its publishing exclusive. Instead, in 1710 Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne8 which protected both the author and
his assignees from competition by outlawing the printing and distribution of copies of a protected work without permission, and by limiting
the term of protection to fourteen years, such a term being renewable if
the author was still living. The Statute of Anne, with its limited term,
ruled the disposition of copies of the work and national registration, and
7. A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 1 (1985).
8. 8 Anne c. 19, 1710.
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its penalties for unlawful publication of a protected work 9 became the
model from which all subsequent Anglo-American copyright law is
derived. 10
The United States Constitution of 1789 empowered Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, "to promote the progress of sciences and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." The first
federal Copyright Act of May 31, 179011 contained provisions analogous
to those in the Statute of Anne. Courts strictly construed this Act, and
an author had to carefully comply with a tortuous set of requirements
or lose protection for the work altogether.12 Gradually the realm of
materials eligible for copyright protection, as well as the privileges associated with such protection, has been expanded. 13 In an effort to bring
some order to an increasingly patchwork body of law, a complete revision of subject and language was undertaken and passed by Congress in
1909. Subsequent amendments in 195414 and 1980,15 as well as revision
in 1976,16 account for the current copyright law.
Although Blackstone recognized an author's property interest in
their work as the product of intellectual labor, 17 this appeal to natural
rights only goes so far toward an understanding of the nature of and rationale for copyright. The preamble to the Statute of Anne states, "For
preventing therefore such practices for the future (i.e., unauthorized
publishing of another's work), and for the encouragement of learned
men to compose and write useful Books; may it please your Majesty
9. Id. Unlawful publication penalties included a fine of one penny per page as well
as the destruction of infringing copies. A similar remedy appears in the current American
copyright law; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 503-04 (1976).
10. A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 1.
11. Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
12. A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 5.
13. Expansion of federal copyright protection included addition of the followingprints and engravings (Act of Apr. 29, 1802, Ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171); musical compositions (Act
of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436); dramatic compositions with right of public performance 1856, photographs (Act of Mar. 3, 1865, Ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540); paintings, drawings,
sculpture, and models (Act. of July 8, 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198). See A. LATMAN, supra
note 7, at 5-6.
14. Act of Aug. 8, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-743 (1954) (modifying domestic law to conform
with the then-signed Universal Copyright Convention).
15. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 (1980) (adopting provisions of the CONTU
Report extending copyright protection to new technology such as computers).
16. Federal protection to works from the moment of fixation in any tangible form, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976); providing a single term of protection of author's work for author's
life plus 50 years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976); recognition of "fair use" common law doctrine
statutorily; providing for devisability of copyright ownership, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). See
A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 9-10.
17. 2 BLAcKsToNE CoMMENTARiEs 405; A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 1.
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that it (i.e., the Statute) may be enacted.. ."18 The United States Constitution seeks "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts"
by granting exclusive limited rights to creative individuals for their
"writings and discoveries." This right granted by copyright is the right
of an author/creator to control the reproduction and distribution of
their intellectual creation. 19 Since the Statute of Anne, these rights
have been protected by suits for infringement in the form of copying
and distributing such protected works without permission of their
author.
A copyright grants the creator or holder five basic exclusive rights
with regard to their original work. 2° These rights are: the right (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies of the work to the
public by sale, rental, lease, or other transfer of ownership; (4) to perform the work publicly in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, or choreographic work; and (5) to display the work publicly if it is a sculpture,
drawing, or a work within a category in (4) above. There are exceptions
to a copyright holder's exclusionary rights, which describe certain uses
where an action for infringement will not lie: the "fair use" of a work
or excerpts from it for teaching, critical, or scholarly uses;2 ' single copy
reproduction of the work for library or archival use;2 2 and use for cer23
tain performances generally in a teaching or worship capacity.
"Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.., from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 24 This fixation requirement was
one of the initial stumbling blocks in the way of copyright protection
for software and disk operating systems in general, until courts decided
that fixation only required that the work be fixed for more than just a
transitory period, and that the requirement could be met by a program
25
embodied in read only memory ("ROM").
An important limitation on the exclusive rights granted by copyright is that only the expression of an idea is protected. Copyright does
not confer any proprietary or exclusionary rights to any underlying
idea, process, method of operation, or discovery. This expression re18. A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 2.
19. A. LATmAN, supra note 7, at 10.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
21. Id. § 107.
22. Id. § 108.
23. Id. § 110. 17 U.S.C. § 117 reiterates the "fair use" and single copy archival exceptions and applies them to a computer product.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
25. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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quirement raised two questions concerning software: was software eligible for copyright at all, and if so, how does the term "expression" relate
to the essential communicative function of the work.
The court in Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.2
provided answers to both questions. After analyzing the definition of
copyrightable works in the statute,- the CONTU Final Report of
1979,28 and Congressional action, the court found operating system programs copyrightable as literary works.-9 The communicative hurdle
had been braced by an old precedent which had limited copyright protection to works designed to be read by a human reader.3° The Franklin court found that the language of the statute setting forth the
protection granted,3 ' and the legislative history3 2 allowed, the copyright
of a program in object code since the expression of the program could
be perceived with the aid of the computer machinery.3 3 Copyright protection has since been extended to visual display of the program separately from the software producing such display34 and has even been
extended beyond the program's literal code to the program structure
and organization.35
B.

THESE RIGHTS GRANTED ARE COMMERCIAL IN NATURE

Looking once again at the rights granted by copyright, it is clear
that those rights are intimately related to the commercial exploitation
of the protected work. Excluding any "psychic income" or benefit from
creating and showing any original work, a right to reproduce 36 and produce derivatives of a given original work,3 7 to distribute, 3 8 perform,3 9 or
26. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
28. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
29. Franklin,714 F.2d at 1249.

30. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that a
piano roll was not in a copyrightable form since without a player piano only a few experts
could "perceive" the music).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
32. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 21.
33. Franklin,714 F.2d at 1247-49; see also Williams Elecs., 685 F.2d at 876-77.
34. Stein Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852
(9th Cir. 1982); Digital Communication Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449
(N.D. Ga. 1987).
35. Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236-39 (3d Cir.
1986); see also NEC Corp. and NEC Elecs., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 2 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,379 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
37. Id. § 106(2).
38. Id. § 106(3).
39. Id. § 106(4).
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publicly display40 such a work is only of value to an author insofar as
he or she might reap an economic reward. One must eat in order to live
and to create, and eating costs money. Society's interests, however, are
not so much with the artist's appetite. More cynically, since time immemorial it has been an observed fact that humans are subject to motivation by monetary reward; "every man has his price," often to the
detriment of society at large. Perhaps Article I, Section 8, is a shrewd
harnessing of this baser human nature to actually effectuate social benefit instead. Granting a circumscribed right to commercial exploitation
then uses the available tool of individual greed to advance society's
knowledge.
Copyright seeks to enrich society as a whole by encouraging creative and learned individuals to create novels, treatises, musical and dramatic works and, more recently, computer software. To reap these
benefits, governments grant limited rights to the exclusive commercial
exploitation of such works to those who create them, thus creating a
limited monopoly. This bundle of rights regarding a given work has potential market power, limited, of course, by the ingenuity of the exploiter (i.e., marketing), the usefulness or intelligibility of the work, and
the public demand. Copyright interest vests not so much in the work
itself as it does in the distribution of that work;41 a suit for infringement lies not against one who goes to the store, purchases a book, and
takes it into possession, but for copying and distributing the original aspects of another's protected work. Copyright protects duplication of a
work or derivations of it without permission, and in doing so and protecting an author's exploitative rights, copyright encourages not only future works from the same author, but also fosters the independent
creation by others of competing works. Thus, the real danger of the
government granted and protected rights arises when these exclusive
rights are used to decrease competition and reap a greater reward for
42
the grant-holder than society reaps from the work.
Early American cases construing Article I, Section 8 consistently
held that the grant-holder's interests were secondary to the interests of
the public at large (i.e., the public benefit derived from the grantholder's inventiveness) and that where the two interests clashed the interests of the public would prevail. 43 Modern cases have reached the
40. Id. § 106(5).
41. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring); 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976); see also Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14,
24 (2d Cir. 1976) (copyright in the United States being exclusively economically based,
"moral rights" of authors are to be vindicated in other tort actions).
42. A. LATMAN, supra note 7, at 12; see also Kaplow, The Patent Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARv. L. REV. 1815, 1821-22 (1984).
43. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 19-21 (1829) (holding that an inventor who
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same conclusion." Thus, the subordination of private exploitation
rights to public welfare is an established part of the law. Consistent
with this hierarchy of interest, courts may, and will, withdraw the protection of legal rights to commercial exploitation of an article when

such rights have been misused to the detriment of public welfare as a
whole; infringement suits then will not be entertained by the court. 45
C.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE IN JEFFERSON PARISH

Justice O'Connor, in a footnote to her concurrence in Jefferson
ParishHospital No. 2 v. Hyde" (discussed more fully in Section III, infra), states that it is a common misconception that patent, copyright,
high market share, or uniqueness suffices to demonstrate market
power.47 This footnote, completely unrelated to the case before the
Supreme Court at the time, has provoked widespread agitation and has
been seized upon by both courts" and the scholarly literature49 to support the notion that tying arrangements should be analyzed under a
allowed public sale and use of an invention, and only later applied for a patent could not
sue for infringement of any protected right); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320
(1833) (patent protection being a reward for inventiveness, the legal grant of exclusive
rights to an item thought to be novel yet previoasly available overseas would serve no
public purpose); Kendall v. Winson, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328-29 (1858) (while withholding an invention defeats the public interest in promoting the progress of science, delaying
the patent application and marketing in order to test and perfect it serves a higher public
good and thus infringement suit was upheld).
44. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 164 (1975).
45. E.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-67 (1943); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948); Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppinger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942).
46. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
47. Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor appears to contradict
herself in measuring the economic power potential in a copyright grant when writing for
the majority in Harper& Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985).
There the Court held that the fair use doctrine did not excuse the unauthorized publication of excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs. Justice O'Connor found an infringement
due to The Nation (the publication of Nation Enterprises) taking for itself the "right of
first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right." 471 U.S. at 549. Justice
O'Connor found the author had a "property interest in exploitation of prepublication
rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and
marketing." 471 U.S. at 555. If copyright grants a valuable market interest which, prior
to publishing, can support an infringement action in a non-fiction work, then it appears
inconsistent for Justice O'Connor to say that this same right or others granted by copyright, when marketed together with another separate product, is insufficiently powerful
to support an allegation of illegal tying.
48. A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
49. Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1144 n.31 and 1149 nn. 60-61 (1985);
Thompson, Old Laws v. New Technology: Antediluvian Antitrust Tying Prohibitionsand
Operating System Software, 2 SoFTwARE L.J. 221 (1988).
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rule of reason rather than a per se approach, since it is not clear that
copyright implies sufficient tying market power. Although perhaps
marginally true in its abstract form, this footnote and its unfortunate
language adds little to the discussion of tying illegality. Of course, it is
true that an unexercised and unmarketed copyright confers no market
power. Competing substitutes, if they exist, may pave inroads into a
given grant-holder's economic return. However, it is also true that a car
not taken out of the garage is not part of the problem of Los Angeles
traffic congestion. But just as the statement about cars gets us no further toward a concrete settlement of a transportation nightmare, so too
do Justice O'Connor's off-handed comments as to copyright and market
power move us no further toward resolution of the legality or illegality
of tying with respect to copyright.
Her comments fail to perceive that copyright grants a prospective
property, a potential for exploitation, and a potential market power.
The real question is not so much what has been initially transferred in
the abstract as it is how these rights to commercial exploitation have
been exercised and what limitations a society ought to put upon such
commercial exploitation. 5° Justice O'Connor also fails to deal with
United States v. Loew's, Inc.5 1 (discussed infra Section III), a case
squarely on point, and which is cited in conjunction with patent tying
cases by the majority in Jefferson Parish in support of the notion of
economic power available through copyright.52 Therefore, any judgment or article relying too heavily upon such footnote authority should
be deemed immediately suspect. It is not the copyright in a vacuum,
but the exercise of exclusive exploitative rights that is the cause for
concern.
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS

In an influential 1957 article,5 3 Bowman coined the term "leverage"
to describe the increase in monopoly power in a second market due to
the extension of previously existing monopoly power in a first market.
Bowman believed that such leverage, if existent, was at worst a neutral
50. Justice O'Connor also relies heavily upon R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx
(1978) and Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981); see Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 36-38. For a systematic deconstruction of Bork, Posner, and the
"Chicago School" of economic-legal theory in general, see Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly
Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1985); Slawson, A Stronger,Simpler Tiein Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 671, 685-90 (1980) (criticizing Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Problem of Leverage, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) upon which Bork, Posner, and
others of the "Chicago School" heavily rely).
51. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
52. 466 U.S. 2, 10 nn.13-15.
53. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Problem of Leverage, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957).
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phenomena. For purposes of this Note, a broader definition will be seen
as more appropriate to real world situations: leverage is the extension
of economic advantage in whatever form from one product market to
another, including not only market share but also grants of exclusive

rights.
Tie-ins are prohibited under Section 3 of the Clayton Act 5 4 as
agreements conditioning the sale of goods upon agreement by the purchaser not to "deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor... where the effect... may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce." Tying is also illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act 5 as a contract in restraint of trade among the several
states. The Supreme Court has pronounced tying arrangements to be
5
illegal per se on several occasions. 6
The arguments against the existence of leverage and the per se illegality of tying seem to fall into two broad categories, the "Fixed Sum"
argument, 57 and the "Comparative Innocuousness" arguments.ss The
Fixed Sum argument focuses on the potential monopolist's return for
his or her actions, whereas the Comparative Innocuousness argument
compares the effects of various business practices to determine whether
distinctions of illegality make any sense.
A.

FIXED SUM ARGUMENT

Briefly, the Fixed Sum argument states that the market will only
allow a monopolist to reap a given fixed reward, no matter how monopoly power is exercised. A party with a legally obtained monopoly may
gain profit either all from its own market (tying product), all from another (tied product), or from any combination thereof, but the total
amount of profit, or restriction, that a monopolist may derive or impose
is fixed regardless of the choice of allocation.5 9 Thus, the overall gain
derived by a monopolist is fixed and dependent upon the differing demands of the buyers and their responses to the monopolist's pricing policies regardless of allocation. 60 Assuming the original monopoly power
54. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
56. See infra Section III.

57. Bowman, supra note 53; BoRuK, supra note 50; Posner, supra note 50; Thompson,
supra note 49; Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 36 (Justice O'Connor's concurrence).
58. Thompson, supra note 49; Blair & Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Alternative Vertical Control Mechanisms, 20 CoNN. L. REV. 523 (1988); Bays, Tying ArrangementsShould Be Per Se Legal, 26 AMER. Bus. L.J. 625 (1988).
59. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 517-18. See Director & Levi, Law and the Future; Trade
Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281, 290-92 (1956), and Bowman, supra note 53, at 21.
60. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 518 (citing R. Posner, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 173 (1976)).
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was achieved legally, then such profit maximizing behavior should be
deemed permissible, and monopoly extension, although conceptually illegal, is thought to be impossible because of the existence of the fixed
sum return.6 1 Thus, for a given amount of power, indirect exploitation
through restrictive practices can cause no more damage than direct
exploitation.
Fixed Sum proponents draw a distinction between profit maximization practices and practices that extend monopoly, calling the former legitimate, and while conceding that the latter practices are illegitimate,
conclude that because of fixed sum returns they are impossible. But
just as it matters to us as individuals just where a terrorist with a single
stick of dynamite places such dynamite,6 2 so too does it matter where
and how exclusive economic power is exercised. 63
The distinction between profit maximization and monopoly extension is arbitrary; both practices are initially motivated by a firm's desire
to increase profits.6 Indeed, the distinction seems to be more of a timing situation; profit maximization refers to practices with short run effects; and monopoly extension refers to practices with more long term,
downstream effects. As such, it begins to resemble a line-drawing game
trying to decide when a firm is profit maximizing, when it is extending
power, and whether a welfare loss should be categorized as legitimate
or illegitimate.65 What really occurs is that a firm uses different tools
for different time frames with the overall aim of changing market conditions so that the firm may receive a greater return. 66 As well, short
run decisions may have long term effects, as is evident in oligopolistic
pricing and subsequent market entry foreclosure. 67 Thus, the mere labeling of an act gives no a priori reason to permit or prohibit a given
act, based merely on time frame.
Similarly, an inability to raise a product's price does not necessarily
imply a lack of monopoly power. Indeed it may be that this simply
marks the limit of a successful and complete exercise of monopoly
power. A firm has completely exercised its power and is now extracting
maximum profits; this tells nothing about the relationship between a
6
firm's marginal costs and its marginal revenue. s
61. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 519-20.
62. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 516, 520.
63. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 525.
64. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 523.
65. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 523-24.
66. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 523-24.
67. See J. DALTON & S. LEVIN, THE ANTITRUST DIEMMA 118-20 (1974).
68. See generally Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition,
45 AM. ECON. REV. 29, 57-62 (1955).
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COMPARATIVE INNOCUOuSNSS

The comparative innocuousness argument compares tying arrangements to other restrictive practices such as vertical integration,69 describes the costs and benefits of each, and then concludes that, since the
results of both practices are often benign to the public, distinguishing
between per se illegal tying and rule of reason treatment of vertical integration makes no sense. 70 The problem with this and other economic
criticisms of tying is that such criticisms proceed from unrealistic premises which, though perhaps useful as heuristic devices, bear little resemblance to real business world practices. 71 For example, vertical
integration (and, it is argued, tie-ins) can be seen as a method by which
a manufacturer may achieve economies of scale in production, thereby
lowering marginal costs and thus unit costs to downstream purchasers.
However, if a manufacturer has achieved a dominant market position,
or the product provided is unique, there is no reason why a manufacturer should now swallow any production costs savings as extra profits,
and no inherent reason to pass such savings on to buyers. In fact, in Japan, where the home stereo market is highly integrated (with manufacturers controlling production, distribution, and retail sales), Japanese
consumers pay 60% more for Japanese-produced goods than do consum72
ers in neighboring Asian countries or in the United States.
C.

INFORMATION IMPERFECTIONS

Another premise of economic models is that all market participants
have perfect information on both products and market conditions and
that their actions are directly influenced by such information. Certainly
this is not true for real world buyers. Buyers may lack adequate information on prices or on the quality of competing products to intelligently
compare them. 73 It is also possible that buyers simply do not understand what it is that they are agreeing to, either because of ignorance,
or because of failure to read contracts. In specific, buyers might have
difficulty calculating, in advance of a sale, just how much a tie-in is
likely to cost over the course of the contract. This in turn requires the
buyer to guess how much more he will pay under this contract than on
the open market, the likely future price of a product, the possibility of a
69. Vertical integration exists where one large firm owns the means of production
and/or distribution at several levels of the chain connecting raw material to finished product in the consumer's hands. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1401 (5th Ed. 1979).
70. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 58; DALTON & LEVIN, supra note 67, at 37-56 (discussing the return in terms of social welfare among various types of antitrust suits).
71. Kaplow, supra note 50, at 535-38.
72. Japan's Consumer Boom" The Pricey Economy, ECONOMIST 21-24, Sep. 19, 1989.
73. Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection
Issues, 62 B.U.L. REV. 661, 676-78 (1982).
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product proving to be inferior, and the possibility that other sellers
might be easier to deal with.74 The probability of such precise prognostication is in reality practically nil.7s A manufacturer may misconceive
76
its own interests or misjudge a market for its own product.
Even if such wide information dissemination existed, it is not clear
that buyers make their choice in the market based solely upon such information. Sellers may impose a tie-in by threatening a cutoff of the tying product. If the buyer already has a substantial investment in the
tying goods and may experience severe transaction costs from switching
to another supplier (if available), then the buyer will have little choice
but to go along with a tying arrangement. 77 Even though buyers may
learn that a tying arrangement has been imposed upon them they may
not, as envisioned by economists, rise up and reject such arrangements
either collectively or individually. Because of transactional costs involved in switching suppliers, a "locked-in" buyer may grudgingly go
along with a deal which in the aggregate costs him more or provides
him with unwanted goods. Collective rejection of a tying arrangement
should not be expected because of the difficulties of organizing and enforcing such a group boycott. Any individual buyer is likely to expect to
reap the same benefits of a successful boycott whether or not he joins.
Thus, if the harm to him is relatively small, or he is just not sufficiently
motivated, he may attempt to free ride upon other supposed boycotters.
In the event of widespread tying by a manufacturer to dispersed buyers,
transactional costs make free riding almost irresistible. 78 Therefore, arguments that see customer acquiescence as a means of making a tie appear more "reasonable" should be suspect. Acquiescence does not imply
a lack of harm.

D. OTHER UNREALISTIC ASSUMPnONS
Another icon of economic argument, the profit maximizing firm, is
not necessarily something that a firm may wish to emulate and thus
should not be taken as a given in deciding upon the legality or illegality
of a given practice. Short term profit maximization may not even be in
a firm's competitive interest. For example, Motorola, by foregoing short
term profitability and concentrating on research and development, upgrading product quality, decreasing production costs, and pursuing increased market share has become a major competitor in both Japan and
74. Id. at 672-73.
75. Slawson, Eliminatingthe Forcing Requirements for Tying Arrangements,unpublished manuscript, Sep. 28, 1989.
76. E.g., Coca-Cola enraged its customers by substituting New Coke for its popular
traditional formula (now sold as Classic Coke).
77. Craswell, supru note 73, at 674-75. See also Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1342-43.
78. Slawson, supra note 75, at 28-29.
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Southeast Asia in telecommunication and semiconductor chips.79
Moreover, it is not true that monopoly power in the classic sense of
a dominant tying market percentage or a power to raise prices is necessary to impose a tie-in. Defining the relevant market for a product
based upon available competing substitutes is at best an arbitrary process s ° which may greatly influence the perception of a firm's market
power. "[S]uch all or nothing choices often generate misleading inferences even when the market chosen is best in that it mismeasures
power less than any alternative." 8'
"Notwithstanding the accepted
principle that market shares must be interpreted in their context,
courts tend to focus on the share yielded by a market definition and
then to assume that any percentage figure means the same thing in
every industry."8 2 The connection between market share and market
power is a very loose one, involving an enormous range of uncertainty.83
E.

THE HARmFULNESS OF TYING

Professor Slawson has recently made the legally novel but common
sense point that no tying product market power at all is necessary to
impose a tying arrangement. s 4 All that is necessary is that a seller be
willing to lower prices in the tying product, this being directly counter
to the classical picture of a monopolist using power to raise prices. Instead of making up the difference by increased tied product prices, a
seller might forego short term profits or even incur losses in order to
cement a place for its product in the tied market. Later, after driving
out tied market competitors, the seller could raise prices and reap a second monopoly windfall. Alternatively, sellers can use tying arrangements to begin receiving a supra-competitive profit upon a tied product
right away, rather than subjecting the product to the market forces of
competition which would yield a more accurate measure of the product's value.
Even though not harmful to buyers, such tying arrangements can
harm tied market competitors by removing buyers from that tied market on the basis of the packaged deal. In other words, a segment of the
consumer world is foreclosed from these tied market sellers for reasons
that have little to do with the competitive merits of products in the tied
market, at little or no expense to the perpetrator of the tying
79. The Rival Japan Respects, Bus. WK., 108-18, Nov. 11, 1989.
80. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTImUST ANALYSIS 572 (1988).

82. Id. at 572-73.
83. Id. at 574.
84. Slawson, supra note 75.
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"[T]ie-ins are almost invariably used only when competing sellers
in the tied product market cannot feasibly counter them by offering
lower prices, so that their almost invariable effect is to eliminate this
competition entirely." 86 A large multi-product firm using tying arrangements could thus prevent "the world beating a path to the doorstep." Preventing the small firm from profiting as a result of its
innovation by injecting this alien element into the tied market is not
only unfair, but also comprises a drag on innovation itself.8 7 Such conduct may thus injure competition without necessarily injuring a particular consumer. s8
Per se proscription of tying arrangements is a legislative and judicial response to the failure of economics to provide workable tools for
grappling with the observed anticompetitive effects of this practice. In
addition to taking advantage of imperfect buyer knowledge to increase
sales, tying harms competition by foreclosing the tied market to competing products. The tied product, by borrowing name recognition or
desirability or advantage from the tying product, is sheltered from competition strictly on the merits of its own quality versus other tied market products. Existing competitors then must either slash prices and
hope to retain their market share, or offer a similar deal, thereby entering a second product market (the tying market) that they may not have
desired to enter or may lack the expertise to succeed. This requirement
for simultaneous performance in two markets may raise entry barriers
(financial, psychological, production) such that new competitors are effectively prevented from entering the market. Thus, long term competitive pressure in the tied market will be lessened such that there is less
of a spur from firms to improve products and lower prices. Because of
the potential for competitive and consumer harms, the ambiguity of
economic data and analysis, and the huge costs in court time required to
perform a Rule of Reason analysis, per se proscription of tying has been
chosen by courts as an efficient means of discouraging this anticompetitive behavior.
III.

SUPREME COURT CASES INVOLVING UNIQUE PRODUCTS
AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS

The Supreme Court since 1917 has declared tying arrangements to
be illegal, especially when such arrangements involve patented or copy85. Slawson, supra note 75, at 9; see also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947) (salt price assurance aspect of the contract).
86. Slawson, supra note 75, at 12.
87. Slawson, supra note 75, at 14.
88. Slawson, supra note 75, at 24-25.
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righted materials. Although developed over a number of decades, several themes emerge. Tying arrangements are per se illegal because the
risk of harm from them is so likely, and the economic justification for
them so slight, that elaborate investigation into the economic conditions
of a given market is deemed unnecessary as a waste of judicial resources.8 9 A plaintiff must prove three elements to establish per se illegal tying. There must be separate products with the purchase of one
conditioned upon purchase of the other; sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain competition in the
tied product; and an effect upon a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied market.90 The Court has further defined the meaning
of these three requirements and has entertained the possibility of defenses to tying liability, approving some and disapproving others.
In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Afg. Co.,91 the
first post-Clayton case, plaintiff licensed the use of its patented movie
projector on the condition that it be used only to show films made by
plaintiff. Defendant was sued for using the projector outside the scope
of its license by showing other films. At the time, plaintiff's projector
was essential to the operation of a movie theatre. The Court found the
restriction imposed by plaintiff extended his granted monopoly or economic power beyond that given by the patent from the projector market into the film maker, and refused to hold defendant for patent
infringement.
In United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States,9 2 the Court found
a Section 3 Clayton Act violation where United Shoe leased its patented
machines to shoe manufacturers upon the condition that the lessee not
use the machinery of any competitors, upon threat of lease cancellation.
At that time United Shoe enjoyed a dominant position in the production
of shoe machinery. 93 The mere failure to enforce in some cases the restrictive practice was found to be no defense; this partial foreclosure of
the market to competitors was no more reasonable than a total
foreclosure 9 4
89. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 44-47, 49 (1961); Jefferson Parish Hospital No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-11. 15-16
(1984).
90. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969), [Former
I]; Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984); A.I. Root Co.
v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1986); Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at
16-21.
91. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
92. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
93. Id. at 457-58.
94. Id. at 458-64.
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InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v. United States,95 was a significant step toward a per se rule.96 IBM leased its patented computing
machines upon condition that they be used only with punch cards made
and marketed by IBM. Not only did IBM have a patented product but it
had garnered 81% of the punch card market. The Court entertained
two defenses to per se illegality: that the restriction was necessary to
preserve the good name of IBM by minimizing downtime due to card
jamming (a quality control argument); and that the arrangement allowed IBM through the sale of cards to meter the amount of use by a
lessee and thereby discriminate among users, presumably to pass on the
lower costs of the system to lighter users. In rejecting the former, the
Court said "there is no contention that others than applicant... cannot
meet these requirements. It affirmatively appears, by stipulation, that
others are capable of manufacturing (suitable) cards... ."9 Price dis-

crimination as a defense was simply rejected out of hand. The Court
suggested that a less restrictive alternative would be for IBM to publish
specifications for cards to be used with the machines. 98
In InternationalSalt Co. v. United States,99 the owner of patents on
two machines utilizing salt leased the machines subject to the condition
that the lessee use salt purchased from the patent owner, International
Salt. The machines were used to inject salt during the commercial food
canning process. The Court found this lease agreement to be illegal declaring that "it is unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market."'10 The Court interpreted the Clayton Act as having a broader mandate than just outlawing gross acts of trade restriction. "Under the law, agreements are forbidden which tend to create a
monopoly, and it is immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one

rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the direction of the movement."''1 1
The Court in reaching the patent issue enunciated a point similar to

that developed in Section I supra, that the grant of a patent entitles the
patent holder to protection from infringement so long as the holder extracted his pecuniary reward from exploitation of the patented item
alone, not from a combined sale of patented and unpatented items re95. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
96. L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRusT 436 (1978).
97. 298 U.S. at 139.
98. Id. at 138-40.
99. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
100. Id. at 396 (citing Fashion Originator's Guild v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 80, 85 (1940), ff'd,
312 U.S. 457 (1941)).
101. 332 U.S. at 396 ("Nor is it determinative ... that petitioners may not yet have
achieved a complete monopoly. For it is sufficient if it really tends to that end, and to
deprive the public of the advantages which flow from free competition.").
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straining trade in a second item. 10 2 Although the term "limited monopoly of the invention" was used, it will become clear that the Court had
another kind of economic power in mind; not an economic power by virtue of monopoly by market percentage, but rather by virtue of the fact
that a unique product was insulated by government patent decree from
competitive pressures. It was the extension of advantage gained by pro03
tected uniqueness that the Court declared illegal.'
The Court in InternationalSalt entertained three defenses from a
decree of illegal tying and rejected all three. International Salt claimed
that lessees had the choice of buying salt at a lower price on the open
market so long as International Salt could not furnish the salt at an
equal price; this was part of the lease agreement. Far from being a defense, the Court found that this acted to stifle salt competition. To capture any market share, a competitor would have to undercut
International Salt's price, whereas International Salt could hold its market share merely by meeting the competition. 1° 4 The company also
claimed its machines required extremely pure (98.2%) salt in order to
function properly; thus, such a restriction was justified on grounds of
protecting International Salt's goodwill through customer satisfaction
and low maintenance costs. 10 5 The Court accepted this premise for argument's sake but failed to find "that the machine is allergic to salt of
equal quality produced by anyone except International."'1 6 Other salt
competitors did offer such pure salt, therefore International Salt, like
IBM, could furnish specifications as a less restrictive alternative to
tying. 10 7
During the same term, the Court addressed the question of tying
arrangements involving copyrighted materials and declared them an illegal restraint of trade. In United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,x0s
the defendants engaged in '"lock-booking," which involved licensing
one feature film or group of films on the condition that the exhibitor
also license another feature in a given time period. The exhibitors objected to such licenses because the arrangement often required them to
accept inferior films in order to get a license to show a highly popular
film. i ° 9 The Supreme Court approved of the district court's reasoning
from previous patent tying and patent misuse cases 10 and affirmed that
102. Id. at 395-96.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 396-97.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 398 (citing I.B.M. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936)).
107. Id. at 398.
108. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
109. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1946),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
110. 334 U.S. at 157-58; 66 F. Supp. at 348. A more recent example of a copyright issue
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tying copyrighted products to the lease of another product, whether or
not copyrighted, was illegal."' In the Court's view such arrangements
contravened public policy in two respects: they prevented competition
on the merits of a product; 112 and enlarged the gains that a copyright
holder could garner beyond that entitled to them by their copyright.
This in essence forced the public to pay too much for a given measure of
113
inventiveness.
The Supreme Court once again faced the block-booking of copyrighted films in the sale of films to television in United States v. Loew's,
Inc. 114 The Court again held that such contracts violated the Sherman
Act and observed that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond suppression of competition.""I 1 5 The Court gave two reasons for
concern over tying agreements: "[They may force buyers into giving up
the purchase of substitutes for the tied product ..
and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product...."1 6
The Court went on to make explicit (by citing both InternationalSalt
and ParamountPictures)what had been implicit in all the previous decisions involving government-granted exclusive exploitative rights and
tying: market dominance alone is not the sole measure of the requisite
economic power to effect a tie-in. Such power could be inferred from
the tying product's unique protection. 117 No Sherman Act Section 2
monopolization needed to be shown since a different kind of economic
advantage in the tying product, here copyright, could effect an illegal
tie-in. 118
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States 1 9 involved another
unique product, several million acres of land, given by government
grant to a railway. These lands were within easy reach of the rail
line 120 and were extensively leased out for grazing, mineral, timber, and
petroleum development. 12 1 In return for these valuable leases, the
lessee was required to ship all commodities produced on the land by
resolution through reasoning from patent law is found in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 404 U.S. 417 (1984) (manufacture and sale of home video tape recorders is not contributory infringement of television program copyright).
111. 66 F. Supp. at 348-49.
112. 334 U.S. at 156-57; see also 66 F. Supp. at 348.
113. 334 U.S. at 158.
114. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
115. Id. at 44 (quoting Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
(1949)).
116. 371 U.S. at 45.
117. Id.
118. Id. at n.4.
119. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 7 n.6.
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way of Northern's rail lines. 122 The Court found the railway had "sub12 3
stantial economic power by virtue of its extensive landholdings"'
which were "strategically located... within economic distance of transportation facilities," land "often prized by those who purchased or
leased it."'12 4 This focus on the location of the land and the obvious fact
that no two solid bodies (or land parcels) may occupy the exact same
position in space at the same time, is another example of recognition of
economic power by virtue of uniqueness.
The Court, citing to InternationalSalt, found tie-ins to be "unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product, and a 'not insubstantial'
amount of interstate commerce is affected."' 12" The Court went on to
say that the harm of tying results from the expansion of economic
power "regardless of the source from which the power is derived and
whether the power takes the form of a monopoly or not."'126 This seemingly open-ended statement of the law is actually the Court's most lucid
to date. Whether economic advantages derive from pure percentage
market share, government grant of exclusive advantage, inherently
unique products, or otherwise, the harms of foreclosure of buyer choice,
inhibition of competition on the merits, and increased entry barriers to
competitors are manifested when such economic advantage extends
through tying from market to market. The Court here' 27 and in International Salt' 28 has shifted the focus to the market where the harm
has been done, once economic advantage has been shown. 12 9
Although not involving a unique product, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States'3o recognized a defense relevant to this discussion. The Court found that a 40% share of the New Orleans newspaper
advertising market was too small to support an inference of sufficient
economic power to find a tying arrangement. 13 1 As a separate ground
for its decision, however, the Court accepted 132 the defendant's argument 1 33 that a morning and evening paper published by a single corpo122. Id. at 3.

123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 11.

127. Id. at 6, 8-11.
128. 332 U.S. 392, 396.
129. This is exactly where the focus of such inquiry should be according to Slawson,
supra note 75, at 29-32.
130. 345 U.S. 594 (1952).
131. Id. at 611-13.
132. Id. at 613-14.
133. See defendant's argument summary, 97 L. Ed. 1282 (1952).
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ration were really one product. Consequentially, that advertisers were
required to take space in both papers violated no antitrust law.
"[N]othing in the record suggests that advertisers viewed the city's
newspaper readers, morning or evening, as other than fungible customer potential. We must assume, therefore, that the readership
'bought' by advertisers in the Times-Picayune was the self-same 'product' sold by the States."'134
The Fortnercases present a confused combination of facts and judicial reasoning from which it is difficult to determine the cases' precedential value. In Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel' 35
(FortnerI), Steel sold prefabricated housing to developer Fortner and
provided 100% financing for acquisition of land and the housing. Fortner, believing that the housing was substandard and overpriced, yet contractually bound to purchase from Steel until repayment of the loan,
alleged that Steel used "unique credit" as a tying product to sell pre-fab
housing. In Fortner I the Supreme Court reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant Steel, and remanded for a
showing of Steel's power in the credit market, having found credit
terms and housing to be separate products and a not insubstantial
amount of tied trade ($689,000 of housing) to be affected. Upon remand,
the district court found not only sufficient tying product power to impose a tie, but also a Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization violation. 136
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the findings of sufficient credit market
power on the part of Steel.L37
In US. Steel Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises(FortnerI1),13 the Court
rejected the finding of a monopolization violation, and also rejected the
finding of Steel's tying market power in credit due to: (1) the influence
of Steel's size on its ability to provide such credit through a subsidy; (2)
that two-thirds of Steel's customers had such arrangements; (3) an alleged non-competitive price for the homes; and (4) the "uniqueness" of
100% financing. It is beyond the scope of this Note to try to derive some
orderly rules from these cases. This Note takes the position that Justice Fortas, in his dissent to FortnerI, was correct when he concluded
"[his
is a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of financing."'1 39 This Note will only refer to FortnerI and II to the mini134. 345 U.S. 594, 613.
135. 394 U.S. 495.
136. "The sole purpose of the loan programs ... was specifically and deliberately to
increase the share of the market of U.S. Steel . . . in pre-fabricated house packages."
United States Steel v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610, 612 n.1 (1977) (Stevens, J. quoting
FortnerI, 394 U.S. 495, 500, while rejecting monopolization allegation).
137. 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975).
138. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
139. 394 U.S. at 522 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see also L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 439-40 &
n.21, 469-70 (discussing the reasoning and result in Fortner I as "absurd").
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mal extent necessary to make the positions of the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits' cases intelligible.
The last Supreme Court decision on tying was Jefferson Parish
Hospital No. 2 v. Hyde' 40 in which the alleged tying product was hospital services and the tied product was anesthesiological services from a
single professional group. 141 In a rambling decision, the Court found
these to be two separate productsle despite no evidence of any adverse
effect in the tied market. 143 It further found that a 30% share of the
patient market for the parish was insufficient indicia of economic
power.'" The Court in Jefferson Parish decided that tying arrangements need only be condemned if they restrain competition on the mer45
its by "forcing" purchases that would not otherwise be made.
Whether this language was necessary for Justice Stevens to get an accord on the Court or whether it states a new requirement is an open
question;14 it is certainly not to be found as a requirement in the cases
prior to Jefferson Parish. The Court forcefully reaffirmed its belief in
per se illegality for tying.147 The single product defense was recognized,"4s but the separateness of the products was to turn on the con149
sumer demand for the items, not their functional relationship.
From these cases we can derive that the essential violation which
tying embodies is the unbridled use of economic power or advantage to
foreclose competition. There are two independent means by which such
power can be demonstrated: percentage market share and uniqueness
of the tying product. These need not be shown to exist together to
demonstrate a tying arrangement; it is sufficient that economic advantage, whatever its form, is being exploited contrary to the public good.
There is no need for a Sherman Act Section 2 monopoly to effectuate a
tying arrangement, and in light of the possibility of effecting a tie-in by
simply lowering prices, such a focus on absolute monopoly market
power is grossly misplaced.
The Court has declared tying arrangements to be per se illegal, but
such a rule as applied really means that it is presumptively illegal and
140. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
141. Id. at 4-5.
142. Id. at 23. C. Slawson, supra note 75, at 12 (ridiculing this distinction).
143. 466 U.S. at 29-31.
144. 466 U.S. at 26-27. Slawson argues that the Court decided this case as it did because the government's brief mislead the Court into believing that per se illegality admitted of no defenses. See Slawson, supra note 75, at 33-36.
145. 466 U.S. at 13, 15.
146. See generally Slawson, supra note 75.
147. 466 U.S. at 9-10, 12-15 n.25.
148. Id. at 19-21 & n.39.
149. Id. at 19 & n.30.

1990]

COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE

that it shifts the burden of raising a defense to the accused.15 The
Court has consistently entertained, discussed, and admitted defenses to
per se illegality, approving some and disapproving others. Two approved defenses are the single product defense,' 51 and a variation of
that, the new product defense.' 52 Further, the Court may have recently
added a third defense, lack of commerce foreclosure in the tied market.153 If so, this leaves unanswered the question of why it is not illegal
for a firm to inflict several individual small harms. The defense of quality control maintenance has been rejected by the Court several times, 154
but such rejection has turned upon the factual situation present in those
cases. The Court has both implicitly and explicitly entertained the possibility of such a defense, but ruled against the defendants because they
did not prove that less restrictive means than tying were unavailable or
unsatisfactory. If the seller could show that selling product A together
with either a service or product B was the only feasible means of assuring that product A performed satisfactorily, the seller might have a
valid defense.
Defenses which have been rejected as a matter of law include metering customer product use to aid price discrimination, 1 ss a right of
first refusal to meet market price for tied items, 1 mere fulfillment of
legitimate contractual obligations giving rise to restrictive arrangements, 5 7 and the defense of occasional enforcement of the tying arrangement. 15s In rejecting each of these defenses as insufficient, the
Court has seen through the rhetoric to view the essential nature of
these situations; such arguments are nothing but smoke screens behind
which sellers have attempted to justify anticompetitive behavior.
Requirements that a buyer purchase two products together, as opposed to legitimate single products that provide cost benefits, serve no
legitimate purpose. Such arrangements are only likely to appear when
they benefit the seller by increasing his total pecuniary return, and for
150. D. BENDER, PATENT ANTITRUST 67-68 (1982).

151. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952); United States v.
Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curium, 365 U.S. 567
(1961); Jefferson Parish Hospital No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19-21 (1984).
152. Jerrold,187 F. Supp. at 556-58.
153. Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 19 and 30-31. But see Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1957); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,
396 (1947); Slawson, supra note 75, at 29-32.
154. I.B.M. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); InternationalSalt, 332 U.S. at 397-98;
Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
155. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1944).
156. InternationalSalt, 332 U.S. at 396-97; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 10-11.
157. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962).
158. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 45, 458-64 (1922); International Salt, 332 U.S. at 398.
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that reason such arrangements deserve per se condemnation. Taking
advantage of imperfect consumer information, of the inertia of the free
rider problem, and of the elimination of both buyer choice and the possibility of entrance to a competitive market should not be countenanced.
The spur of competition leads to rough overall allocative efficiency,
stimulates innovation and customer service as a means to gaining market share, and approximates the goal of providing the best products for
the lowest price.
Copyright and antitrust both serve important public policies in the
overall goal of allocative efficiency. In copyright, the public reaps the
benefit of creativity, 159 and many societies, including this one, have chosen to stimulate creativity by limited grants for exclusive commercial
exploitation of the created item. Antitrust seeks to maintain competition in the marketplace as a means of allocating resources and final
1 °
products, while safeguarding as much as possible individual liberty. 6
These two tools of public welfare only come in conflict when they are
wielded together for individual gain, when copyrighted goods are tied to
other goods as a tool to restrict competition. Outlawing tying arrangements restores the ability of these two tools of public welfare to work
together harmoniously.
IV.

TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY

Allegations of illegal tying arrangements have arisen in the computer industry, often as a counterclaim in copyright infringement actions. The Sixth and the Ninth Circuit Federal Courts of Appeal have
taken diametrically opposite positions on computer tie-ins involving
software, and these positions are directly related to the two circuits' different views of copyright. The Supreme Court, although once given an
opportunity to review a computer tying case, 16 1 has declined to rule on
this issue. Not surprisingly, the lower federal courts inconsistently rule
on the issue as well.
159. Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 320 (1833); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328-29
(1858); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger, 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1941); Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-67 (1943); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 159 (1948); Loew's, 371 U.S. at 46-50.
160. United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 458-64; Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666-67; InternationalSalt, 332
U.S. at 396-98; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4-5, 9-11; Loew's, 371 U.S. at 44-45; Jefferson
Parish Hospital No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10, nn.12-15, n.19 (1984).
161. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied,
473 U.S. 908 (1985).
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A.

COMPUTER TYING CASES FROM THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

1. 3 P.M. v. Basic Four Corp.1 6 2
Plaintiff 3 P.M. sold, installed, and serviced small business computer systems in the Detroit area. Defendant Basic Four designed and
manufactured computer systems consisting of a central processing unit
and any number of peripherals, all sold as a unitary system under
trademark. Basic Four executed a dealership agreement with 3 P.M.
giving plaintiff an exclusive territory in the Detroit area. In the agreement was an extensively negotiable clause that gave Basic Four the
right to terminate the dealership agreement if 3 P.M. did not meet specific purchasing quotas. Over a period of six months, 3 P.M. sales were
approximately 23% of the agreed upon quota, and after a warning Basic
Four terminated the agreement. 3 P.M. sued for alleged Sherman Act
Section 1 and Clayton Act Section 3 violations.lss The tying product
was Basic Four's computer system, the tied product was the maintenance and service of such systems.
The court, after citing the three part rule of tying from Northern
z c'6 and examining
Paciw
the confused Fortner cases, 165 discussed possible methods of demonstrating a dominant market position in the tying
product.
The court accepted defendants' evidence that their market share
for such computer systems in Detroit was less than 1%. Plaintiff offered only an affidavit alleging a California market share for Basic
Four of 10%. Not only was this evidence irrelevant, it was insufficient
as a matter of law to demonstrate dominance, and the court perfunctorily rejected this evidence. 1
Plaintiff then argued that Basic Four's system was unique in that it
was exceptionally easy to use. As evidence, plaintiff cited defendant's
own promotional literature and the court rejected this weak evidentiary
offer. 16 7 Plaintiff raised the argument that Basic Four's uniqueness was
due to copyright and trademark. While easily disposing of the trademark argument,16s the court gave a restricted reading to Loew's and the
Fortnercases such that it required 3 P.M. to show Basic Four's competitors were incapable of producing similar systems. 169 The court ignored
the extensive language in Loew '8170 which found that copyright did ra162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

591 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
Id. at 1353-55.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1356-57.
Id. at 1357-58.
Id. at 1358.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 1359-60.
170. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1962).
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tionally lead to an inference of economic power, did not examine any of
the cases presented in Section III supra, and relied on In Re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation171 for its contention that copyright does
not establish economic power, a case that had been overruled by the
Ninth Circuit two months earlier. Rather than launching into this exploratory dicta, the court here could simply have rested on its own findl7 2
ings that once again plaintiff had produced no evidence.
The court also found that mere acceptance by buyers of a tying arrangement does not suffice to show illegal tying, 173 although it failed to
perceive that such acceptance could merely be due to free rider inertia.
3 P.M. v. Basic Four, apart from its dicta on copyright, is not so much
an "alternative" to the Ninth Circuit 74 as it is a case of a court dismissing an action simply because of a woefully inadequate evidentiary
presentation. Although the court reached the correct result, its reasons
for doing so are questionable.
175
2. A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.

A.I. Root, a manufacturer of beekeeping supplies and ecclesiastical
candles, had been using Basic Four computer equipment and operating
software manufactured by Management Assistance, Inc. ("MAI"). Root
had over the years purchased computer equipment from Computer/Dynamics Inc. ("CDI"), an authorized MAI dealer, as well as from other
authorized MAI dealers in Ohio. To upgrade its inventory and manufacturing processes, Root purchased new MAI hardware from a dealer
other than CDI. Root then sought to purchase a reconfigured version of
the Basic Operating Software System ("BOSS") Root had been using.
CDI refused to sell the reconfigured BOSS software (tying product) unless Root signed a "licensing agreement" (tied product) requiring first
that Root use only MAI hardware with any application software Root
might acquire, and second, that Root purchase CDI's programming services whenever Root acquired updated or different Basic Four
176
hardware.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's memorandum decision
granting summary judgment for CDI and found no illegal tying ar171. 591 F. Supp. at 1359 (citing In Re Data General Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp.
1089, 1112-14 (N.D. Cal. 1980)).
172. Id. at 1360.
173. Id. at 1360-61.
174. Cf. Note, Unravelling Copyrighted Software From a Tying Arrangement Pre.
sumption; 3 P.M v. Basic Four Corp., An Alternative to Digidyne v. Data General, 12
RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 447 (1987).

175. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 674-75.
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rangement under Sherman Act Section 1.177 The court's decision rested
on three grounds: that CDI possessed insufficient market share in the
small business computer market to support a tie-in;1 78 a disbelief that
copyright confers economic power;179 and the prospective rather than
contemporaneous nature of the tied license agreement. Is °
The court found that the relevant tying product market was for
small business computers and that the MAI system had only a 2-4%
market share, insufficient under Jefferson Parish to support a finding
of market power. Competitors of the MAI system sold by CDI included
IBM, NCR, and Seiko.' 8 ' The Root argument that the relevant market
was for BOSS based systems as unique products was rejected, partially
on the basis of product interchangability and partially because of the
court's view of copyright. L8 2
While acknowledging that BOSS was copyrighted, the court rejected out of hand the Loew's rule that "the requisite economic power is
presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted." 1s 3 "[W]e
find the pronouncement in Loew 's to be overbroad and inapposite to the
instant case."'1 4 The Sixth Circuit all but attempted to overrule the
Supreme Court's holding in Loew's, ignored the line of Court cases (see
Section III supra) dealing with copyrighted, patented, or unique products which lead up to Loew's, and finally did not address the reaffirmation of such a line of reasoning by the majority in Jefferson Parish. The
Sixth Circuit's authority for this rejection was In Re Data General,
(overruled two years earlier by the Ninth Circuit), Justice O'Connor's
Jefferson Parishfootnote (see Section I supra), and a student Note relying heavily upon the O'Connor footnote.ls 5
The court distinguished Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp. (see
infra) in which a copyrighted operating program was found "unique"
due to its "special attraction" for consumers; Root introduced no evidence to prove that BOSS was uniquely desirable. i s8 In light of the
Sixth Circuit's cryptic footnote, which focused on an applicability argument in Digidyne and the pointed discussion of copyright by the Ninth
Circuit in Digidyne, this distinction is unsatisfying.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

675.
675-76.
676.
677.
675-76.

182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
ucts in
186.

Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44 (1962)).
Id.
Note, The Presumption of Economic Powerfor Patented and Copyighted Prod7)ying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140 (1985).
806 F.2d at 677.
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Based only upon its own precedent, 8 7 the Sixth Circuit found a
third basis for rejecting a tying arrangement in that the "tied" license
"product" involved prospective rather than contemporaneous obligations. This requirement for contemporaneous purchase of products is
simply not to be found elsewhere in the law. Indeed, the very transportation contracts tied to the land leased or sold in Northern Pacific Railway included movement of "all commodities produced or manufactured
on the land."' 8 8 There was no requirement that such minerals, lumber,
or products be available for shipment immediately upon signing the
lease. These contracts looked forward in time to when such products
would be available to be shipped, and when tied to the land, comprised
a per se illegal tying arrangement. 8 9
The decision in A.I. Root was based upon a law review Note, dicta
by a single Supreme Court justice in a footnote unrelated to the case
decided, an overruled district court decision, a disingenuous distinguishing of a contrary Ninth Circuit decision squarely on point, and a rule of
its own making with no basis in Supreme Court antitrust law.19° Except for its pronouncements on summary judgment procedure unrelated
to its antitrust arguments, A.L Root is seldom cited. The case still remains the law in the Sixth Circuit on tying arrangements involving
copyrighted products.

B.

COMPUTER

TYING CASES FROM THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In Re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation191 and Digidyne
Corp. v. Data General Corp.x 92 will be considered together since they
are essentially the same case presented at two different judicial levels.
Competitors brought suit against Data General, alleging that Data
General would not license its disk operating software ("RDOS") nor
sell its memory boards unless the buyer also purchased Data General's
central processing unit ("CPU"). 19 3 After extensive discovery, the district processing court refused to grant either plaintiff or defendant motions for summary judgement, stating that a material fact in
controversy was whether Data General possessed sufficient market
187. White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 506 (6th
Cir. 1983).
188. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3 (1957).
189. Id. at 9.
190. Surprisingly, this contemporaneous sales requirement has been followed by at
least one lower court. See Kellam Energy Inc. v. Duncan, 723 F. Supp. 861, 881 (D. Del.
1987).
191. 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
192. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
193. 490 F. Supp. at 1097.

1990]

COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE

power in the tying markets to effectuate a tie.194 In a painstaking decision the Court found all the elements of an illegal tying arrangement
except the requisite tying market power.
The court found that separate product markets were evident and
that the standard for such determination was "not whether the two
items must be used together, but whether they must come from the
same dealer."'195 Ample evidence showed that different manufacturers
produced CPU's, memory boards, and disk operating programs. Thus,
the court concluded that since they were not normally sold as a unit,
they were different products. 196 The court then concluded that a tying
arrangement existed. Since both Data General and the competitors had
and currently did sell memory boards and CPU's separately, and since it
was undisputed that a given CPU need not always be used with a given
memory unit, the Ninth Circuit found that the challenged sales constituted a tie-in. 197 Data General's argument that technological modifications might be required or that servicing problems would be
encountered was rejected by the court as immaterial, conclusory, selfserving, and insufficient to support a finding that CPU's and memory
boards are a single product. 198 "It remains undisputed that at least
some customers do not view CPU's and memory boards as a single product."'199 Mere customer acquiescence to the tying scheme did not establish legality, no fixed proportions of product and CPU were necessarily
dispositive, and alleged economic efficiencies from such sales did not
2
materialize in the form of lower customer costs. 0
The third prong of the tying rule, the foreclosure of tied market
commerce, was also found. The rule the Ninth Circuit applied was from
Fortner1201 where the threshold is simply that more than a de minimis
volume of tied business is affected. Data General had admitted sales of
52,700 CPU's at a value of 254 million dollars; since proof of actual foreclosure need not be shown, this easily fulfilled the requirement. Additionally, the plaintiffs needed only to show that they were in fact
foreclosed, not that all possible competitors of Data General were
damaged.

202

Three "business justifications" closely related to these unitary prod194. Id. at 1098.
195. 490 F. Supp. at 1104 (citing Siegal v. Chicken Delight Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir.
1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 955). For a parallel rule see Jefferson Parish Hospital No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984).
196. 490 F. Supp. at 1105-06 & nn.20-21.
197. Id. at 1108.
198. Id. at 1109.
199. 490 F. Supp. at 1109.
200. Id. at 1109, 1111.
201. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
202. 490 F. Supp. at 1117.
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uct arguments were rejected by the court as defenses. Data General
raised a protection of goodwill defense based upon difficulties in servicing its products when they were coupled to "foreign CPU's."203 The
court replied that two less restrictive alternatives were available: publishing specifications for the type and quality product to be used with
Data General's CPU; or providing a lesser warranty when "unbundled"
Data software was sold for use with such foreign, non-Data General
CPU's. 204 Data General then claimed that such bundled sales were necessary to recoup its heavy investment in software development. However, the court found that this justification had been explicitly rejected
in an earlier case. "If the demand for [defendant's] equipment was so
great, it could recover its investment by raising its prices. Admittedly,
the return would not be as great, but it provides sufficient protection to
serve as a more reasonable and less restrictive alternative to a tying arrangement." 205- Finally, Data General argued that bundled softwareCPU sales would avoid a finger pointing situation when such a system
malfunctioned. The court rejected this as a mere repackaging of Data
General's earlier arguments, and pointed out that different warranty
practices could less restrictively serve clients preferring either bundled
2 6
or hybrid systems. 0
Where the district court got into trouble was in its treatment of
copyright and the economic power in the tying product necessary to implement a tie-in. The court cited Fortner II in which the Supreme
Court recognized that uniqueness in a tying product could be found due
to such a product's legal, physical, or economic advantages. 207 The court
conceded that copyright on software created legal barriers preventing
competitors from producing competing products and thus economic
power could be inferred. 20 8 The court recognized that such a presumption of economic power due to legal uniqueness had been recognized in
Loew's, ParamountPictures, and InternationalSalt. The court interpreted the Loew's decision to have rested upon not only the existence of
copyright, but also upon the inherent unique attractiveness of the films
themselves. Thus, since the plaintiff had not shown in the instant case
that RDOS was as desirable as "Gone With the Wind" and Data General's CPU as undesirable as "Getting Gertie's Garter" (two films mentioned by the Loew's court), the presumption of economic power from
203. Id. at 1120-21.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1122 (citing United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61
(E.D. Pa. 1960)).
206. Id. at 1123.
207. Id. at 1112 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610,
621 (1977) (Fortner II) (quoting with approval Fortner1, 394 U.S. at 505 n.2)).
208. Id. at 1112.
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the existence of software copyright was not conclusive. 2 09
Upon completion of the trial, a jury found that Data General had
indeed engaged in an illegal tie-in. However, the district court overruled the jury and granted defendant's motion for a judgment notwith2 10
standing the verdict or new trial.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the
jury verdict against Data General in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp.211 The appeals court accepted the district court's findings that a
substantial effect upon commerce existed in the tied CPU market and
that there existed separate products due to the demonstrated separate
demand for RDOS and CPU's.2 12 The court added that Jefferson Parish
supported the district court's view of separate products. The recovery
of investment argument for the software-CPU tie was rejected as too
restrictive a rationale. The less restrictive alternative of separately
pricing and marketing RDOS and CPU's would avoid the anticompetitive affect of requiring the expensive simultaneous entry into both mar213
kets by a would-be competitor, an anti-foreclosure rationale.
The appeals court found that RDOS conferred sufficient economic
power upon Data General to produce a tying arrangement because
RDOS was unique in several ways, and because of applied Supreme
Court doctrine regarding unique products. The court found error in the
district court's requirement that Digidyne prove that the copyright and
trade secrets of RDOS prevented competitors from developing comparable systems.214 This would have required Digidyne to prove not only
power due to copyright, but also power throughout the disk operating
market. The court essentially said that the focus of inquiry in the lower
court was incorrect. "The concern is not with the restraint on competition in the tying product, but on competition in the market for the tied
product. What is required is not monopoly power in the tying product
market, but only sufficient power to enable the seller to restrict competition in the tied product. '215 Citing InternationalSalt and Loew 's for
this rejection of the relevance of competing substitutes when the tying
product is legally unique (patent and copyright), the court went on to
find it reversible error to require a Sherman Act Section 2 monopoly in
2 16
order to find tying arrangement market power.
Even assuming the district court's requirement for copyright and
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1112-13.
Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984).
734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1338-39.
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345; see aLso United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 49 (1962).
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added uniqueness was correct, the Court went on to find other indicia of
RDOS uniqueness. "There is abundant evidence . . . that defendant's
RDOS could not be produced without infringing defendant's copyright
and utilizing defendant's trade secrets." "[Cireating and testing a com2' 17
patible system would require millions of dollars and years of effort.
Effectively then, Digidyne had fulfilled the lower court's requirement
that competing substitutes for RDOS were nonexistent.
RDOS was also actually unique for two related reasons. First, at
that time RDOS was a quantum improvement in disk operating systems. It was impossible at the time for competitors to develop operating
system software that would not infringe upon Data General's copyright. 218 Testimony indicated that RDOS was the best in the industry,
running four times faster than any similarly priced program.2 19 It was
factually unique to the marketplace in the same sense as land was in

Northern Pac.fi.
Second, RDOS was desired by customers wanting its unique capabilities. 220 Since increased customer demand for a product with no
available substitutes implies low elasticity of demand, and therefore
power over price, RDOS, from a combination of its inherent superiority
and its great customer attractiveness conferred economic power upon
Data General.
The Ninth Circuit found yet another way RDOS conferred economic power upon Data General, and this was in the concept of "lockin" of both end-line users and downstream applications as well as systems producers. It is prohibitively expensive, once a system is in place
in a given business, to decide to replace it with another system. Such a
replacement results in lost data processing time, which could cripple a
user business, and high conversion costs. The downstream system and
applications producers were a special concern of the court; since RDOS
with CPU's were sold to original equipment manufacturers ("OEM")
who combined them with applications software to resell the endusers,
these OEM's were doubly locked-in. Because of RDOS' Superiority and
customer demand for RDOS, a rational OEM had to offer RDOS to his
customers. Further, these OEM's developed applications software specific to RDOS at a huge cost to themselves, a cost that could only be
recouped by bringing RDOS to market. However, these OEM's could
only get RDOS to market from Data General if they would also take
the CPU. 2 2 ' The Data General CPU was inferior to that offered by
217.
218.
219.
220.
816.
221.

734 F.2d at 1342 & nn.3-4.
Id. at 1342 n.3.
Id. at 1341 n.2.
Id. at 1341; see also In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. at
734 F.2d at 1342-43.
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other CPU manufacturersm and thus, not only were competitors foreclosed from the CPU market, 2 but OEM's were required to take undesirable Data General CPU's to get desirable RDOS. Data General
further enhanced its bargaining power and total return by requiring the
purchase of peripherals as well.224
The Ninth Circuit decision in Digidyne was true to both form and
to substance. It was true to form in that the court accurately applied
long standing Supreme Court precedent and had ample reasons to find
an illegal tying arrangement. Two separate products were linked, disk
operating systems and CPU's, separated evidently by differential customer demand and the existence of competition in the CPU market.
Five-hundred-twenty million dollars worth of tied market CPU commerce was affected, and other firms were foreclosed from effective competition with Data General by the effective requirement for
simultaneous multimarket entry, an impossibility given Data General's
copyright.
The decision was also true to substance in the recognition of the
way copyright confers economic power. RDOS provided economic advantage to effectuate a tie due to: (1) its government protected grant of
exclusive economic exploitation via copyright; (2) the factual nonexistence of competing substitutes and due to copyright the impossibility of
producing substitutes; (3) RDOS' vast superiority over other disk operating systems at the time; and (4) customer demand, either outright or
as a result of lock-in for RDOS, its product differentiation. These findings reflect an accurate intrinsic and practical understanding of the economic nature of copyright.
Justice White's dissent from denial of certiorari for Digidyne22 reproaches the Ninth Circuit for a failure to do "sufficient market analysis," yet Justice White ignores the long settled Supreme Court view that
uniqueness is a separate means to economic advantage. 2 26 This criticism
simply misconceives the nature of the question: Does copyright confer
economic advantage such that tying arrangements involving copyrighted
products should be condemned? Supreme Court precedent, copyright
itself, and the Ninth Circuit answer "yes" to this question-such arrangements should be condemned.
222. Id. at 1343.
223. Id. at 1346-47.
224. Id.
225. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 473 U.S. 908 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
226. Justice White's dissent nowhere discusses any of the cases presented in Section III
supra except Jefferson ParishHospitalNo. 2 v. Hyde, a case holding on the insufficiency
of a 32% tying market share.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
C.

[Vol. X

SUBSEQUENT COMPUTER TYING CASES

The Digidyne decision has not been a popular one, and has been
criticized by both courts227 and commentators. 2 2s The Ninth Circuit itself has drawn the line on uniqueness at the copyright level, finding
that trademark, standing alone, is insufficient to presume tying market
economic power.22 9 The court, apparently stung by criticism, has drawn
a rational line here, but its apparent endorsement of conservative economic theory 230 is troubling. Since trademark protects primarily goodwill and goodwill has been found insufficient as a business justification
for a tying arrangement, perhaps this is best seen as a rough attempt at
judicial symmetry.
Two district court cases deserve mention as exemplifying-tWe current confusion that reigns regarding computer tying arrangements. In
Allen-Myland Inc. v. LB.M.231 the issue was whether a unit sale of upgrade parts and services constituted an illegal tying arrangement. This
case, like 3 P.M. v. Basic Four, essentially was decided on a lack of
plaintiff evidence, although the court made some unnecessary antiDigidyne comments. Plaintiff, a possible competitor, failed to establish
a demand for computer service (tied market) separate from that for upgrade parts (tying market). 23 2 Not only was IBM's market share of 32%
insufficient as a matter of law to infer market power,23 3 but in both
markets there was evidence of a complete lack of entry barriers, 234 one
of the evils per se proscription of tying seeks to eliminate. The court
could have rested upon a finding of insufficient evidence of separate
products, supposedly parts and services. Instead, the court launched
into a long discussion of the presumption of economic power via copyright, citing A.I. Root approvingly and disapproving Digidyne, 2- 5 declaring patent mere prima facie evidence of economic power requiring
further market inquiry (conceding Supreme Court rules to the contrary
in Jefferson Parish),236 and eventually resting on a rule similar to that
in AL. Root requiring plaintiff to show competitors could not produce
227. A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1986); AllenMyland Inc. v. I.B.M., 693 F. Supp. 262, 281 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
228. Thompson, supra note 49; Note, supra note 174.
229. Mozart Co. v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987).
230. Id. at 1345. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 50; Slawson, supra note 50.
231. 693 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
232. Id. at 282-83.
233. Id. at 278 (citing Jefferson Parish Hospital No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), and
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952)). See supra Section
III.
234. 693 F. Supp. at 278-80.
235. Id. at 281-82 & nn.41-42.
236. Id. at n.41.
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rival tying products. 7
The discussion of copyright economic power was skirted by the
court in Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro.m3 Telerate claimed that Caro
infringed Telerate's copyright by selling software which allowed Telerate subscribers to copy its computerized financial data. Caro counterclaimed an illegal tying arrangement by Telerate, tying financial data to
the purchase of a given computer terminal. The court found that there
was no demand for Telerate terminals ("STN") apart from the demand
for Telerate data.2 39 Telerate marketed financial information in a
number of formats, only one of which required an STN terminal. Not
only was the same information available from Telerate in different formats, 240 but Telerate would allow subscribers to use their own terminals to receive STN format financial data.2 41 Therefore, not only was
there no separate terminal market foreclosed, but the STN format was
only one of several products sold by Telerate, a product in competition
with other financial formats. This availability of alternatives did not
lead to a Digidyne-like lock-out effect, 242 and thus the single product
defense was successfully raised here in Telerate.

D. APPLYING THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULES TO THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CASES
Section IV-A supra has shown that the most rational basis for the
decisions by the Sixth Circuit in 3 P.M. and A.. Root were inadequate
evidentiary showings by the plaintiffs. Applications of the rules of per
se illegality for tying, a presumption for tying market power for desirable copyrighted software, and the availability of a single product or
quality control defense would not have necessarily led to different outcomes in both cases. Nevertheless, the basis for such decisions would be
more in line with prior understandings of both copyright and tying
arrangements.
In 3 P.M. v. Basic Fourthe termination of the distributorship would
once again be upheld on the basis of plaintiff's inability to market the
BOSS systems in sufficient numbers to fulfill their distribution contract. Basic Four's provision of maintenance and service to purchasers
of the BOSS system could benefit purchasers if, due to Basic Four's part
inventory and experience with the system, Basic Four could offer a
package of "BOSS computing services" with an overall lower price than
the cost of the computer and a separate maintenance contract from another provider, if indeed such a maintenance market even existed sepa237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 282.
689 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.

242. Id. at 236.
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rate from the system. Buyers of the system as well, having spent large
sums of money for their computer, might naturally expect the seller to
provide such accompanying services. This application of a single product defense would not alter the result of the case, nor require extensive
dicta as to copyright power.
Alternatively, assuming such a maintenance market did exist, if defendant Basic Four could demonstrate the superiority of such "inhouse" maintenance contracts over other providers, Basic Four might
prevail under a quality control defense. Such maintenance being necessary to the functioning of the BOSS system, and not being adequately
available elsewhere, Basic Four then was only responding to legitimate
customer needs for quality maintenance of a quality computer system.
This would assume, however, that the less restrictive alternatives of
publishing maintenance instructions or offering the services contract as
a possible alternative warranty program would be unsatisfactory.
Applying these rules to the A.L Root case could well lead to a different outcome than that reached by the Sixth Circuit. It certainly appears abrupt for the court to affirm a memorandum summary
judgment, having recognized that contrary case law existed from both
the Supreme Court and another federal circuit. Clearly, two markets
were linked, and copyrighted operating systems and programming services and apparently competition existed in the programming services
market. CDI requested that A.I. Root not deal in the programming
services of other suppliers and that Root use only MAI hardware in return for which CDI would sell reconfigured BOSS to Root.
If the presumption of copyright as economic power had been accepted by the court, the burden would have shifted to CDI to show that
such a linked sale was quality control motivated or was a single product.
There are insufficient facts in the record to predict whether CDI would
have prevailed with such a defense. The case would turn on whether
consumers perceived that BOSS software and programming services
were two different products that need not come from the same dealer,
and if in fact such separate providers existed in Detroit. Certainly a full
trial is a more appropriate forum for settling such matters than in a
memorandum decision.
V.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY

The rights granted in copyright (to reproduce, distribute, prepare
derivatives, perform and display a work) are only of value to copyright
holders insofar as they provide them with monetary gain. Society has
struck a Faustian bargain with a creator, granting exclusive rights to
the economic exploitation of a creative work in order to foster overall
societal welfare for continued creativity. These rights at the instant
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granted provide prospective market power, and when exercised by the
holder, provide true market power. Would-be competitors (unless they
independently come up with a compatible program without using the
original as a guide) are prevented by the law of infringement from offering the same product. Since copyright protects an author's expres-.
sion of an idea, further works by other author's may not be marketed
when they contain protected expressive elements of the prior author's
work.243 Copyrights may be so extensive in themselves or may be so
combined with other protective rights that they effectively prevent the
rise of competing substitutes due to the impossibility of "engineering
around" such blocks of government protected ingenuity.2 " Copyright
then leads rationally to a presumption of sufficient economic advantage
to enact a tie-in.
Copyright confers a "uniqueness" in that an area of economic control and power with regard to a creative work is carved out of the public
domain and given exclusive governmental protection. In the case of operating systems software, this legal protection of economic rights combined with the costs of software research and development, the
requirements of compatibility between applications programs and operating systems, and high customer demand for "better" program leads
rationally to a presumption of the existence of a discrete focus of economic power in the hands of the one who controls the rights to the production, distribution, and derivation of future works for that operating
system. In other words, the copyrighted software, while legally protecting the expression, but not the underlying idea, results in a unique
center of economic advantage.
In addition to its legal and inherent uniqueness, copyrighted work
may provide economic advantage due to its desirability to consumers,
whether they be remarketers or endline users. This desirability may
simply be due to an effective advertising campaign or it may be due to
the work being a quantum improvement over pre-existing products. In
either case, the desirability of the product should be seen as additional
evidence of a copyright holder's ability to enforce a tie-in.
Society, by this bargain with creators, has itself created individual
foci of exclusive economic advantage in order to gain an overall collective good. Such foci of advantage are strictly circumscribed since they
run counter to the general practice of encouraging open competition to
achieve allocative efficiency. The focus of inquiry needs to be not only
on the reward to the grantee, but also takes into account the monopoly
loss borne by society as a whole. Only to the point that the net gain to
243. Note, The Logic of Foreclosure,79 YALE L.J. 86, 90, 94 (1969).
244. Kaplow, supra note 42, at 1869-72 (discussing the undesirability of costly "inventing around").
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society is positive should a given grant of exclusive right be allowed.m
Educational or archival use of copyrighted works also advance the goal
of wide dissemination of such creative works or information. Likewise,
society is concerned when a copyright holder seeks to bind or restrict
entry to markets other than for the copyrighted work itself because
such acts increase the overall payment that society must make to encourage creativity.
Tying arrangements involving copyrighted works thwart both the
goals of copyright and of competition, harming both competitors and
consumers. Competitors are harmed by the narrowing or foreclosure of
the tied product market. In order to effectively compete, another producer must either cut prices and endure a loss or, more likely, enter
into the tying product market. A new competitor almost certainly
would need to enter both markets simultaneously, multiplying both
costs and uncertainties involved in bringing a new competing product to
market. This foreclosure results from a tied product borrowing some of
the cachet of the tying product, whether that be tying product superiority, brand recognition, or other marks of differentiation. Thus, competition in the tied market is no longer based on the product's merits
because the market has been skewed by the introduction of an outside
economic advantage having little to do with the comparative quality of
the item. Buyers then make choices in the tied market that they would
not have otherwise made; in order to get a unique or desirable tying
product, buyers purchase tied items which may not be as well suited for
their needs as other competing items. Sellers using tying arrangements
take advantage of imperfect buyer knowledge, the inertia of free rider
thinking by buyers expecting others to rectify these harms, and the protected status of their copyrighted item which competitors cannot produce for fear of infringement. Tying arrangements expand market
share for future price increases or reap immediate super-competitive
profits.
The policy against foreclosure can be seen as a common sense judicial reaction to the failure of economic theory to provide workable standards for measuring such broad effects. "[Tihe Court is responding to
economic indeterminacy with a method of analysis placing primary emphasis on equality of opportunity, free access to markets by competitive
sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers."246 The Court's per
se illegality rules make both economic and administrative sense. Where
any degree of market power over the tying product exists, foreclosure
of tied market competition is possible. 247 Given the uniqueness and eco245. Kaplow, supra note 42, at 1827-31.
246. Note, supra note 243, at 93; see generally Slawson, supra note 50.
247. Note, supra note 243, at 100.
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nomic advantage inherent in copyright, the existence of a copyrighted
tying good does rationally lead to a presumption of sufficient market
power. The availability of less restrictive alternatives to achieve the
supposed benefits of tying had led the Court to rightly question and reject such "benefits" when offered as excuses for tying behavior. The
rules of per se illegality with limited recognition of defenses are both
simple for courts to enforce and for business-people to order their affairs around. 8 Such per se illegality avoids the necessity of attempting
to apply an economic theory that tends to be vague, abstruse, and devoid from reality to economic data that tends to be voluminous and ambiguous 24 9 in order to pass upon the legality of a practice with few or no
demonstrated redeeming qualities.
The Ninth Circuit in Digidyne showed an understanding superior
to that of other circuits of the economic advantages inherent in copyright, the underlying policies and current law of antitrust, and the
harms that can arise from computer tie-ins. The computer industry is
one in which product development occurs at a rapid pace and although
there are large firms occupying major market positions, much of the
software innovation and user friendly applications have been because of
small firm innovation. Competition from small firms specializing in a
given software or hardware market has lead to three consumer advantages: rapid product improvement, wide choice of products, and lower
prices.
Computer products, whether hardware, software, or information itself, are sold individually and packaged together, and there is customer
demand at different times for different product sizes. But it is as nonsensical to say that a disk operating system and computer hardware are
inherently a single product 25° as it is to say that a videotape and a monitor are a single product. 25 1 The mere chance that the two might be
used together does not mean that they must be used together or are
subject to the same regulatory scheme. Copyright and demand can and
does exist for programs and videotapes apart from the apparatus with
which they are perceived. In light of the competitive harms possible
from tying, per se illegality with defenses of "single product" and "quality control," when justified, should be the rule applied. The proof of
separate or single status should not turn on whether the products are
functionally related (for all components in a computer system are functionally linked), but on whether there is differential customer demand
248. Slawson, supra note 50, at 671.
249. Slawson, supra note 50, at 671. See generally W. HUDSON, BUSINESS WITHOUT
ECONOMISTS 15-44 (1987).

250. See Buyers Guide and Handbook, 1990 Computer Review, COMPUTER 79-130 (examples of the huge number or possible combinations of hardware and software).
251. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 21.
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for the items apart from one another. Such a rule has already been successfully applied in Telerate and elsewhere.2 2 If such a single product
is being sold, it likely saves consumers costs or serves their needs and
therefore should not be condemned. Treating components of a computer as separate products allows small firms to concentrate upon improvements in quality or service in a narrow field. This in turn keeps
the pressure on large firms to likewise innovate rather than sit back
complacently.
Justice O'Connor's concern over per se semantics253 reveals her
true interest. She seeks to subject tying arrangements to rule of reason
scrutiny only, with all its attendant analytical ambiguities, in order to
effect a de facto legality for tying. "With only slight exaggeration, there
is really only one thing one needs to know about the rule of reason:
when the rule is applied, the defendant virtually always wins. '2"2 The
Sixth Circuit, by adapting Justice O'Connor's reasoning, has set forth a
rule of tying involving copyrighted goods which does have this effect.
Neither rule shows any concern for the competitive harms of tying nor
for the fact that the Clayton Act proscription was enacted precisely to
replace such a judicial sieve with a legislative wall.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has long recognized that tying serves hardly
any redeeming purpose and that the practice is only likely to be found
when it is of particular benefit to the seller. Per se illegality has always
admitted the possibility of defenses and, this concern for the Court's
grammar is really a subterfuge to undermine the proscription itself.
Per se illegality will harmonize the policy concerns of copyright and antitrust by not allowing these two different methods of insuring societal
welfare to overlap and thus conflict. The current rule is simple, effective, and responsive to the realities of the computer industry as evidenced by Digidyne and Telerate. Such a rule should remain the law.
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